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Introduction 
Significant and persistent diversity of firm characteristics within an industry is well documented and 
puzzling (Dosi et al., 1997). Indeed, some contributors to the field argue that intra-industry firm 
diversity has been a driver for the development of strategic management (Noda and Collis, 2001:922). 
Yet little or no attention has been paid to how intra-industry type diversity (measured as size or age 
diversity) affects firm survival. The oversight is evident in three major disciplines where system (e.g., 
industry) evolution and constituent (e.g., firm) dynamics are important areas of study: biology, 
industrial organisation, and organizational ecology.  
In biology, the debate on the relationship between species diversity and ecosystem stability is well 
documented (Elton, 1958; McCann, 2000; McNaughton, 1993). The received wisdom here is that 
species diversity contributes to eco-system stability either because of complementarity between species 
and/or due to asymmetric vulnerability of the diverse species to external shocks. What is usually 
overlooked in this line of research is the following question: even if diversity is conducive to ecosystem 
stability, what does it imply for the survival of the system’s constituent parts?  
A similar oversight is observable in the management literature, which tends to focus on the 
relationship between within-firm diversity and firm performance (Kilduff, Angelmar, and Mehra, 2000; 
Richard, 2000; Boone and Hendriks, 2009). Here the attention is on the performance of the firm as a 
micro ecosystem – at the expense of the performance or rewards enjoyed by the diverse actors or 
strategies that shape the diversity of the firm. The analogy is less evident in the case of industrial 
organisation (IO) literature as the latter does pay attention to how industry-level factors (e.g., the 
innovation regime or the level of market concentration in the industry) affect firm survival (Agarwal 
and Audretsch, 2001); Audretsch, 1991; Geroski, 1995). However, the implications of intra-industry 
type diversity for firm survival remains below the radars of the IO research effort too.  
To address this knowledge gap, we propose and tests two novel hypotheses on the relationship 
between intra-industry type diversity and firm survival: (1) Intra-industry type diversity measured as 
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age or size diversity is associated with higher exist hazards for constituent firms due to complexity of 
the fitness distribution in diverse industries, where the probability of suboptimal choices is higher and the 
selection of the fittest is less likely at the same time; and (2) Investment in research and development (R&D) 
reduce the risk of exit hazard in diverse industries by enabling firms to engage in active learning about 
their optimum market and/or technology niches.  
Our hypotheses are informed by a theoretical framework that combines insights from four disciplines.  From 
theoretical biology, we draw on Kauffman (1993; 2016) who demonstrates that diversity is a source of complexity 
that generates a rugged fitness distribution within the ecosystem. A rugged fitness distribution features multiple 
local optima, separated by shallow troughs and absence of a global optimum. In such settings, some constituents 
face a higher risk of exit hazard as the co-evolutionary pockets they belong to may be saddled on a local fitness 
optima that fall short of ensuring resilience to adverse shocks.  The higher the complexity of the ecosystem is, the 
greater is the risk of belonging to a co-evolutionary cohort saddled on a sub-optimal fitness peak and hence the 
higher is the mortality risk in the face of adverse shocks.  
We combine the insights from theoretical biology with those from the organisational ecology 
literature (Hannan and Freeman, 1989; Barnett and Hansen, 1996; Barnett, 2008). In this work, firm 
adaptation in highly diverse industries is costly and requires continued learning in dealing with shifting 
competitive landscapes and changing logics of competition through coevolution of different firms. 
Adaptation becomes increasingly difficult in a context-specific competitive “arms’ race”, especially 
when firms compete over similar resources. This is particularly clear in Barnett and Hansen (1996) and 
Barnett (2008), who find that firms become maladaptive when cohort diversity in an industry increases. 
In such setting, firms tend to suffer from organizational myopia, inertia, and uncertainty of routines, all 
of which are due to co-evolution of diverse competitors.  
From industrial organisation (IO), we draw on Ericson and Pakes (1995) who demonstrates that 
heterogeneous firms that invest in R&D experience high level of mortality rates in the initial learning 
period, but this will be followed by longer survival time for R&D-active firms as the latter discover 
their optimal product/technology niches. This insight form IO resonates with findings from game theory 
with bounded cognitive abilities, where players (firms) with larger capacity for information processing 
(Challet and Zhang, 1998) or those with higher cognitive capacity (Strzalecki, 2014) are able to choose 
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better strategies with higher payoffs. It also ties in with two strands of literature organisational learning: 
(i) the early contribution of Cohen and Levinthal (1990) who demonstrate why prior knowledge is a 
significant determinant of absorptive capacity; and (ii) later work that focuses on the co-evolution of 
knowledge environments, organizational forms and combinative capabilities as determinants of 
acquiring absorptive capacity (Grant, 1996; Bosch, Volberda, and Boer, 1999).  
To test these hypotheses, we use two different measures of intra-industry type diversity: the Theil 
entropy index and the coefficient of variation of firm age and employment within 3-digit SIC industries. 
We report that firms within more diverse industries experience higher rates of exit hazard. We also 
report that intra-industry type diversity and R&D investment are substitutes in that higher levels of 
R&D intensity are associated with lower exit hazard at each level intra-industry diversity. These 
findings are robust to: (i) controlling for own (direct) effects of age and size; (ii) a battery of sensitivity 
checks, including step-wise estimations, different diversity specifications, firm cohorts and control for 
frailty; and (iii) a wide range of firm, industry, and macroeconomic factors that have been investigated 
as potential determinants of firm survival in the existing literature.  
 The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we review the related 
literature and derive our testable hypotheses. Then we present our dataset, which consists of 35,136 
R&D-active UK firms from 1998-2012 with 158,316 firm-year observations. Here we also discuss the 
diversity measures, namely the Theil entropy index and coefficient of variation of firm age and size 
within 3-digit industries, and elaborate on our estimation strategy. The estimation results and their 
correspondence with existing work are discussed, followed with a conclusions that distil the main 
findings and discus their implications.  
 
Related literature and research hypotheses 
Although criticised by Hodgson (1993) for failing to fulfil the promise of moving from economic statics 
to dynamics as a necessary step for developing an adequate evolutionary analysis, Alfred Marshall 
(1898) can be considered as the pioneer of invoking biological analogies in economics. For Marshall, 
the theory of evolution in biology is useful in understanding how variety leads to a stable equilibrium 
through selection based on profitability. In this paper, we also invoke biological analogies into 
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economics to investigate the effects of variety (diversity) not on industry stability, but on the survival 
chances of the constituents (firms). 
For example, the “insurance hypothesis” in biology posits that diversity has a stabilizing effect on 
aggregate ecosystem properties. The effect is due to a-synchronic responses of the diverse species to 
environmental shocks (Loreau, 2010: 53; Yachi and Loreau, 1999). This argument is in line with earlier 
work by Elton (1958) and McNaughton (1993), who drew attention to a positive relationship between 
diversity and ecosystem stability in terms of population densities and compositions.  
Applied to industry evolution, the insurance hypothesis would imply that higher levels of intra-
industry diversity would be associated with stable firm density and composition. Such conclusions, 
however, would be contentious for two reasons – one theoretical and one empirical. Theoretically, May 
(1974) demonstrates that a growing number of differing species leads to larger fluctuations in ecosystem 
populations and could result in extinctions. Similarly, Yozdis (1980) reports that complex ecosystems 
might be more fragile due to high specialization and smaller scope for interaction between different 
species. In between, Lehman and Tilman (2000) argue that biodiversity may stabilize aggregate 
ecosystem properties such as biomass, but may also destabilize the dynamics of the system’s 
populations.  
Further doubt is cast by Huisman and Weissing (2001), who demonstrate that competition between 
heterogeneous species for three or more resources leads to chaotic fluctuations in species’ populations; 
and the results (i.e., the winners) of such competition are not predictable even in deterministic settings. 
Moreover, the uncertainty about the results increases with more types of species competing over larger 
number of resources. Finally, Mougi and Kondoh (2012) demonstrates that the effect of diversity on 
ecosystem stability is non-monotonic as it is mediated through the types of between-species 
interactions, which can be antagonistic, competitive, or mutualistic.  
 The association between biological systems’ diversity and stability is also contested 
empirically. According to Ives and Carpenter (2007), only 23 percent of findings from 13 studies 
indicate a positive and significant relationship, whereas 46 percent of the findings indicate a negative 
relationship, and the remaining 31 percent indicate a relationship close to zero. It appears that what 
matters for ecosystem stability is not species diversity, but the extent of heterogeneity in the responses 
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of the species to environmental fluctuations. If species’ responses are convergent, the biological 
system’s diversity is a source of system instability (Ives and Carpenter, 2007).   
More importantly, however, the insurance hypothesis is not helpful for the study of the relationship 
between ecosystem diversity and constituent survival. Irrespective of whether diversity is conducive to 
system stability, its effects on constituent survival cannot be deduced from its effects on the system as 
a whole.  To uncover the relationship between system diversity and constituent survival, we need to 
trace the implications of the system diversity for adaptation strategies of the firms. A seminal work in 
theoretical biology (Kauffman, 1993) provides significant insights into how complexity is related to 
ruggedness (multi-peakedness) in the fitness distribution (the opportunity space) and how the latter traps 
the adaptive walks by the constituents.  
In his NK(C) complexity model, Kauffman (1993) analyses how the self-organised properties of a 
system with N elements (traits or firms), K random connections (epistatic inputs) for each element, and 
C co-evolutionary (intercoupling) pockets can enhance or limit the “efficacy of the natural selection” 
measured as: (i) the fitness level of the elements or their sets that had adapted to past shocks; and/or (ii) 
the survival prospects of the sets depending on their positions on the fitness distribution. Kaufman 
(1993) demonstrates that a global maximum of selection efficacy, i.e., the survival of the fittest, is 
usually not achievable in complex systems where complexity lies between ‘order’ and ‘chaos’.   
Kauffman (1993: chapters 2 – 5) allows for a rich set of conclusions, four of which are the most 
pertinent for the analysis in our paper. The first states that system complexity is an increasing function 
of the number of constituents (N) and the number of co-evolutionary pockets (C). The second states 
that the fitness distribution becomes more rugged and multi-peaked - i.e., it will be characterized with 
a larger number of local optima and a higher incidence of conflicting constraints - as the random 
connections between constituents (K) increases. The third states that the average fitness level is lower 
the more multi-peaked is the fitness distribution. This is because constituents may never attain a global 
optimum due to combinational explosion of the possibility space. Finally, the fourth conclusion 
indicates that the survival prospect of constituents in a co-evolutionary pocket depends not only on the 
magnitude of the next shocks, but also on the past adaptation journey of the pocket and the position it 
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occupies in the rugged fitness space. Adapting elements face moving fitness peaks as other elements 
change so that search for optimal fitness becomes complex and elusive.  
McKelvey (1999) draws on the NK(C) model to demonstrate how firms should avoid excessive 
complexity by optimising the number of internal and external value-chain competencies. He reports 
that the firm’s competitive advantage is maximised when organizational complexity (internal co-
evolutionary density) is moderate; and that the level of external co-evolutionary density sets an upper 
limit to the benefits from internal complexity. Stated differently, high levels of internal and external 
value chain complexity is a hazard factor that reduces the firm’s competitive advantage.  
In this paper, we are interested in the implications of the NK(C) model for the relationship between 
complexity and firm survival when complexity is proxied by firm-type diversity (measured as intra-
industry age or size variety).  Two of the NK(C) model parameters - the random connections for each 
firm (K) and the co-evolutionary pockets within the industry (C) - are not observed directly in the data. 
As proxies for their product in the NK(C) model, we use two measures of type diversity: the Theil 
entropy index and the coefficient of variation of firm age and size.  In what follows, we first discuss the 
relevance of age and size as type identifiers that mediate firm performance in general. Then, in section 
three, we discuss the strengths and drawbacks of the proposed diversity measures.  
There is a wealth of literature on how firm age or size may act as a moderating (contingency) 
variable that conditions the relationship between an explanatory variable and an outcome variable in 
various models of firm performance. An early study, Hofer (1975), demonstrates that the effect of 
strategy on firm performance varies by firm size. This is confirmed by Smith et al. (1989) who also 
report that the relationship between strategy and performance varies by firm size. Vaccaro et al., (2012) 
report that different firm sizes call for different leadership types, with smaller and less complex firms 
more likely to benefit transactional leadership whereas larger and more complex organizations benefit 
more from transformational leaders. A moderating role for firm size is also reported in Zona et al. (2013) 
in the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and innovation outcomes; in Dean, 
Brown, and Bamford (1998) where responses of small US manufacturing firms to competition are faster 
and more flexible than those of larger companies with structural inertia; and in Hannan and Freeman 
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(1989) where  the effects of company sunk costs, concertation, profitability, excess capacity and R&D 
on entry decisions differ by firm size groups.  
A number of studies also report a moderating role for firm age. For example, Sørensen and Stuart 
(2000) find a significant association between firm ageing and rates of patenting and innovation novelty. 
Other studies report that firm (or venture) age has a moderating effect on the relationship between 
entrepreneurial orientation and firm growth (Anderson and Eshima, 2013; Lumpkin et al., 2006).  These 
findings are in line with an earlier call for a systematic treatment of age as a moderating variable in 
Quinn and Cameron (1983), who argued that the criteria and methods needed for effective performance 
vary with age. More recent evidence in Coad et al., (2016) also accords age with a significant 
moderating role as R&D investment by young firms are significantly riskier than R&D investment by 
more mature firms.  
Given this rich debate concerning the mediating (indirect) effects of age and size diversity on firm-
related outcomes, we are surprised by the absence of control for indirect effects of age and size in firm 
survival models. This oversight is also in stark contracts with the theoretical insights of the complexity 
literature discussed earlier. As summarised by McKelvey (1999), excessive diversity increases system 
complexity and may undermine the firms’ competitive advantage. This is due to uncertainty about the 
quality of the local optima and the difficulty in identifying the global optimum within rugged fitness 
landscapes associated with complex systems. This type of opportunity spaces increase the probability 
of suboptimal states (choices) and limit the selection of the fittest at the same time (Kauffman, 1993; 
Kauffman, 2016; McKelvey, 1999). Unexpected functional shifts in firm artefacts may lead to 
discontinuous evolution in an industry and emergent processes challenging adaptation, which is known 
as exaptation (Andriani and Cattani, 2016, Kauffman, 2016), and this is more likely in diverse industries 
with a variety of existing artefacts.  
Given the discussion above, we argue that firm age or size diversity is a source of uncertainty in 
the economic environment in that diversity tends to blur the distinction between optimal and sub-
optimal strategies for fitness maximisation and survival. Also type diversity may be conducive to the 
emergence of co-evolutionary pockets (firm groups) saddled on shallow local fitness optima that may 
make the firms vulnerable to adverse shocks. Hence, the first hypothesis (H1) of this paper can be stated 
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as follows: Higher levels of firm type (age or size) diversity within an industry is associated with higher 
rates of exit hazard.  
H1 is compatible with, and has the potential of unifying, the insights from organisational ecology 
literature (Hannan and Caroll, 1992; Hannan and Freeman, 1977, 1989; and Hannan, 2005) and from 
game theory, particularly the insights from the literature on games with different cognitive hierarchy of 
players  and imperfect information (Arthur, 1994; Camerer, Ho, Chong, 2004; and Kets, 2012).  
In the organisational ecology literature, density (the number of firms in the industry) and cohort 
diversity increase exit hazard (Hannan, 1998; 2000). Similarly, Barnett (2008) demonstrates how cohort 
variety increases the costs of discovering and adaptation to rivals’ behaviour and creates significant 
uncertainty in the firms’ coevolution trajectories. The cost of firm adaptation is an increasing function 
of the number of distinct rivals and variation in their experience. On the other hand, Barnett and Hansen 
(1996) emphasizes the role of arms races or Red Queen evolution in competition, which increases the 
risk of maladaptation when firms compete with highly varied cohorts of rivals. The increased risk of 
maladaptation is driven by the firm’s limited capabilities to deal with the complexity of the rivals’ 
responses, especially with the new threats that emanate from rivals with unshared co-evolutionary 
histories (Barnett and Sorenson, 2002). These insights are supported by empirical findings in Barnett 
and Hansen (1996), who utilize piecewise exponential models and report that the diversity of the bank 
cohorts in Illinois increased the failure rate. 
Further empirical evidence is provided by Barnett and Pontikes (2008:1240), who utilize an 
exponential model of firm failure rate in the US computer industry and report that an organisation’s 
“…alignment with one context limits adaptability into other contexts”, and that organizations are more 
likely to exit if an industry evolves to a different context due to higher industrial diversity. Another 
empirical study based on long-term data of retail banks in Illinois concludes that “organizations 
confronted by a widely varying distribution of competitors grow more slowly and are more likely to 
face new entrants” mainly due to competency traps, search and adaptation costs of facing multiple 
cohorts of competitors that use different practices and bring a variety of threats (Barnett and Sorenson, 
2002: 289). Variety of firm types within an industry makes it difficult to forecast rivals’ actions and this 
increases uncertainty of firms’ strategies. Zahra, Neubaum, and El-Hagrassey (2002) find negative 
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relationship between perceived external strategic environmental uncertainty and return on equity in new 
ventures.  
 In addition, H1 also speaks to findings in the literature on games with incomplete information, 
where players’ types are unknown ex ante and players act on the basis of their beliefs about the types 
of their interlocutors. The information processing constraint in such games will be more biting when 
players (firms) are more diverse/heterogeneous. According to Camerer et al. (2004), informational 
constraints of this nature induce agents to engage in iterative thinking with k steps (level-k thinking) or 
with a variety of cognitive hierarchies (Strzalecki, 2014; Alaoui and Penta, 2016). Discontinuities or 
hierarchies in firm abilities to process the rivals’ strategy-related information in a complex industry 
with a variety of firm (player) types may lead to sub-optimal choices, lower payoffs and hence higher 
probabilities of bankruptcies. In this setting, highly heterogeneous cohorts in the industry increase the 
risk of exit because diversity increases the probability of incorrect inferences and predictions of other 
players’ actions.  
Finally, H1 also resonates with work in strategic management, an early contribution to which drew 
attention to the positive association between environment complexity and perceived uncertainty and 
difficulties in the managerial decision making (Duncan, 1972). Later on, it was argued that “under 
uncertainty, traditional approaches to strategic planning can be downright dangerous” and managers 
can “…suffer from decision paralysis” (Courtney, Kirkland, and Viguerie, 1997: 68).  Furthermore, 
inflexible or maladaptive firms are at disadvantage in uncertain environments and may have to invest 
more resources in alternative projects for insurance purposes (Wernerfelt and Karnani, 1987).  Although 
firms may rely on heuristics as a basis for strategic decisions in complex systems or under uncertainty, 
reliance on heuristics may involve departures from first-best optimization outcomes (Gigerenzer, 2014).  
The insights above are based on the notion of search on an NK(C) opportunity (fitness) landscape 
by heterogeneous firms with bounded rationality. The search is based on experiential learning, which 
enables firms to ‘sample’ the opportunity (fitness) landscape, receive behavioural feedback and adapt 
with a view to discover their optimal niches in the fitness landscape (Levinthal, 1997; Felin et al., 2014). 
This is akin to passive learning in stochastic models of industry evolution and firm dynamics (Jovanovic, 
1982; Hopenhayn, 1992). As argued in Felin et al. (2014), however, firms are not ‘algorithmic 
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information processors’ only; and they are faced not only with a relatively well-defined opportunity 
(fitness) landscape that is a function of intra-industry type diversity but also with a nebulous but 
important novelty/innovation space. The firm’s position in the latter and the draw(s) it makes from it 
depend on its position in the fitness landscape and the resources it invests in learning and exploration.  
We argue that R&D investment is a good proxy for investment in learning and exploration, which 
enables the firm to discover new fitness peaks with better payoffs in conditions of complexity. This 
argument is in line with Fleming and Sorenson (2001), who analyses invention as a search over 
technology landscapes using patent citations. R&D expenditures is the key supply side component of 
this search process. Furthermore, the literature review by Tidd (2001) concludes that uncertainty and 
complexity are main environmental contingencies that affect the organization, nature, magnitude, and 
management of innovation. Yet, the interaction between complexity (which is a function of intra-
industry diversity) and R&D investment is largely ignored in the survival literature. To address this 
oversight, we state our second hypothesis (H2) as follows: The firm’s R&D investment and intra-
industry firm size or age diversity are substitutes in that firms that invest more in R&D are likely to 
survive longer at each level of intra-industry type diversity.  
We test for H2 in two stages. First, we provide descriptive evidence on whether firms in more 
diverse industries invest more in R&D. Prior work reports that environmental uncertainty increases the 
need for fast adaptation and innovation – as reported by Covin and Slevin (1989) with respect to small 
firms and by Zahra and Bogner (1999) in relation to product and service innovation in the software 
industry. It is also in line with real option models in finance, which predicts higher levels of price 
uncertainty to be associated with higher levels of R&D investment (Pyndick, 1990; Jansen et al., 2006). 
In our context, a positive association between intra-industry diversity and R&D intensity is a 
preliminary sign that firms in more diverse industries do indeed invest more in active-learning as 
survival-enhancing strategy.  
In the second stage we test whether R&D intensity has an indirect effect on exit hazard through 
interaction with intra-industry diversity in addition to the direct effect investigated in prior literature. 
The hypothesized indirect effect shares common ground with Erickson and Pakes (1995) who treat 
R&D intensity as investment in exploration and learning about the firm’s true fitness. In this literature, 
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heterogeneous firms faced with idiosyncratic productivity shocks invest in R&D to identify their 
optimum market/technology niches in the industry. However, the position of the firm on the fitness 
distribution depends on: (i) the stochastic outcome of its investment; (ii) the success of other firms in 
the industry; and (iii) the competitive pressure from outside the industry. The model predicts high 
mortality rates in the initial learning period, followed by longer survival for R&D-active firms that 
discover their optimal fitness levels.  
H2 resonates with arguments in Audretsch, Howeling and Thurik (2004), who point out that firm 
survival is a result of selection and learning processes that involve experimentation with various 
business ideas. Such learning processes are more beneficial to the firm in more complex industry 
environments. It also shares common grounds with Teece (2007) who report that survival in a complex 
environment depends on dynamic capabilities “to sense, seize, and reconfigure” opportunities. Finally, 
H2 also shares common ground with the Schumpeterian models of innovation and selection (Aghion, 
Akcigit, Howitt 2013; Ugur et al., 2016a), where R&D investment enables the firm to escape 
competition by offering new products in market niches with higher entry costs.  
 
Empirical strategy  
We begin by defining our diversity measures – the Theil entropy index and the coefficient of variation 
of employment sizes and firm ages within 3-digit industry codes. We elaborate on the advantages and 
drawback of the proposed diversity measures, and explain how we minimise the risk of potential bias 
that may be associated with either measure. In the second part of this section, we introduce our dataset 
and provide descriptive evidence on the relationship between intra-industry age/size diversity and 
survival times. Finally, we discuss the specification and estimation issues related to discrete-time hazard 
models, the way in which we choose between estimators, and the range of sensitivity/robustness checks 
we undertake.  
 
Measuring firm-type diversity 
Because diversity measures are associated with strengths and drawbacks (Stirling, 2010; Solanas et al., 
2012), we utilise two measures with preponderance of desirable properties: the Theil’s entropy index 
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(TI) and the coefficient of variation (CV) of the firm ages and employment size within 265 industries at 
the 3-digit SIC level. The Theil entropy index for each industry/year (ܶܫ௝௧) is calculated in accordance 
with (1a) below.  
்ூೕ೟ୀ 
భ
ೀ೟
∑ ௅೔ೕ೟
௅ണ೟തതതത
ேೕ೟
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        (1a) 
Here ܮ௜௝௧  is age or employment size of the ith firm in industry j and year t; ܮఫ௧തതതത is average age or 
employment in industry j in year t; and ௝ܰ௧ is the number of firms in industry j and year t.  
Our choice of Theil index is informed by its property of being invariant not only to unit of 
measurement, but also to any scale factor. The TI is also comparable over time and between industries; 
and it is additive, symmetric, decomposable and statistically testable (Theil, 1972; Haughton and 
Khandker, 2009). Nevertheless, the TI is sensitive to the left end of the size distribution - i.e. it may 
better reflect the diversity among smaller firms compared to larger firms (Haughton and Khandker, 
2009).  To address any potential bias that may be due to left-tail sensitivity in our model estimations, 
we control for size and age separately.  
Our second diversity measure is the coefficient of variation (ܥ ௝ܸ௧) for firm age or employment 
within industry j. It is calculated in accordance with (1b) below.  
ܥ ௝ܸ௧ = ඨ
∑ (௅೔ೕ೟ି௅ೕ೟)మ
ೀ೟
೔సభ
ே೔ೕ೟ ି ଵ
 ଵ
௅ണ೟തതതത
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ଵ
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        (1b) 
Here ௝ܵ௧  is the standard deviation of age or employment, and 
ଵ
௅ണ೟തതതത
 is the inverse of the mean age or 
employment in the industry. All other variables are as defined above. Like TI, the CV is also invariant 
to multiplicative scale factors and units of measurement. The drawback here is that it is an interaction 
term between two variables: the standard deviation of size/age and the inverse of the mean employment 
or age in the industry. Therefore, in our model estimations, we control for mean employment in the 
industry to avoid the risk of omitted variable bias (Sørensen, 2002; Bedeian and Mossholder, 2000; 
Solanas et al., 2012). Both TI and CV are monotonically increasing with the diversity of firm age or 
employment in the industry. 
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Data 
We merged two firm-level datasets compiled by the Office of National Statistics (ONS) in the UK: the 
Business Structure Database (BSD) and the Business Expenditure on Research and Development 
Database (BERD) 1 . The BSD provides annual demographic data on births, deaths, employment, 
turnover, number of live local units, foreign/domestic ownership, etc. We excluded companies that 
exited due to mergers and acquisitions. Hence exit in our dataset refers to liquidations or bankruptcies. 
This was possible because both firm and local unit (plant) references disappear from the register if exit 
is due to liquidation/bankruptcy. However, only firm identifiers disappear if the exit was due to mergers 
or acquisitions. We have constructed the exit year as the earliest of the death year recorded by the ONS, 
or the first year when the firm employment and turnover are zero for three consecutive years2. We also 
excluded firms with birth date before 1974 as firms were given the same birth year of 1973 when the 
business register was first introduced in 1973.  
On the other hand, BERD consists of repeated annual surveys with stratified sampling of firms 
known to be R&D-active.  We merged BERD with BSD, using the unique firm (enterprise) identifier3. 
In our dataset, the ratio of R&D to turnover is greater than 1 from the 95th percentile onwards. We have 
considered firms in the top 5 percent of the R&D intensity distribution as outliers and set our baseline 
estimation sample for firms with R&D intensity less than 1. 4  Our estimation sample consists of 35,136 
firms and 158,316 observations from 1998 to 2012. Summary statistics for the estimation sample are 
presented in Table A1 in the Appendix, broken down by exiting firms, survivors and all sample.  
Scatter plots in Figure 1 are based on data within 3-digit industries and allow for visual inspection 
of the relationship between average survival times and average measures of age/size diversity within 
the industry. Scatters in panels (a) and (b) both indicate a negative relationship between age/size 
diversity and survival time, which is equivalent to the positive association between type diversity and 
                                                          
1 The standard disclaimer applies: The use of these data does not imply the endorsement of the data owner or the 
UK Data Service at the UK Data Archive in relation to the interpretation or analysis of the data.  This work uses 
research datasets which may not exactly reproduce National Statistics aggregates.   
2 The second criterion is used because we have identified delays in the ONS assignment of a death code in some 
cases even though the firm’s return for employment and turnover is zero for several years.   
3 Further information on BSD and BERD is provided in Ugur, Trushin, and Solomon (2016b). 
4  Our results are robust to different cut-off points for R&D intensity. These results are not presented here to 
save space, but they are available on request. 
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exit hazard rate postulated in H1. The negative association between intra-industry age/size diversity 
and survival time is observed when diversity is measured with TI (Panel a) and CV (Panel b).  
 
‘Insert Figure 1 here’ 
 
 
Scatter plots in Figure 2 shed light on a different empirical pattern in our data. Whether we measure 
diversity with the Theil index (panel a) or the coefficient of variation (panel b), we observe a positive 
relationship between intra-industry age/size diversity and average R&D intensity in the industry. This 
finding provides an empirical underpinning for H2 in that it points to a higher R&D effort in more 
diverse industries with higher risk of exit hazard. It also confirms findings in prior work, which report 
that firms do invest more in R&D when environmental uncertainty is higher (Covin and Slevin, 1989; 
Zahra and Bogner, 1999). If supported with additional findings lending support to H2, this empirical 
pattern in the data indicates that firms do indeed invest in R&D to learn about their product and 
technology niches and thereby reduce exit hazard in more diverse industries.  
 
‘Insert Figure 2 here’ 
 
 
 
Modeling exit hazard: Main variables of interest and controls 
In this section, we conduct hazard estimations with a view to verify if the descriptive evidence in Figure 
1 is statistically significant after controlling for a wide range of firm, industry and macroeconomic 
factors that have been investigated in the prior literature on firm survival. To do this, we follow the 
general specification for the hazard rate function (Jenkins, 1995), but we use lagged, hence, 
predetermined or weakly exogenous covariates ݔ௜௧  to deal with simultaneity bias. The probability (Pr) 
of exit in year t+1 conditional on observable covariates can be stated as follows:  
Pr(ݕ௜௧ାଵ|ݔ௜௧,ݒ௜)= Pr(ݔ௜௧ߚ + ܯ௜௧ߙ + ݒ௜ + ߛ௧ାଵ + ߝ௜௧ାଵ)     (2) 
Here, i and t are firm and year indices; ݔ௜௧ is a vector of observable firm-level covariates that affect 
firm exit with an estimated vector of ߚ parameters; ܯ௜௧  is a vector of industry, technology (Pavitt 
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classes) and macroeconomic variables that affect firm exit with an estimated vector of ߙ parameters; 
ߛ௧ାଵ are year dummies; and ߝ௜௧ାଵ is the disturbance term. Unobserved heterogeneity between firms is 
captured by the independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal random variable ݒ௜|ݔ௜௧ ,ܯ௜௧ାଵ ~ 
N(0,ߪ௩ଶ). The strong and very common assumption in estimation of such models is that unobserved 
heterogeneity (ݒ௜)  and the disturbance term ߝ௜௧ାଵ  are independent of the firm, industry, and 
macroeconomic covariates.  
How important is the assumption that unobserved heterogeneity ݒ௜ is i.i.d. Normal?  Nicoletti and 
Rondinelli (2010) have evaluated biases in estimated parameters of the discrete time hazard models 
caused by omitting or misspecifying the unobserved heterogeneity distribution using Monte-Carlo 
simulations. Their results demonstrate that neglect or misspecification of the unobserved heterogeneity 
are unlikely to lead to a significant bias in the estimated parameters.  
The variables of main interest in ݔ௜௧ include the TI or CV measures of intra-industry diversity and 
the interactions of the latter with firm-level R&D intensity. The remaining firm-level covariates in ݔ௜௧ 
and the industry, technology class and macroeconomic covariates in ܯ௜௧ are specified in accordance 
with the best practice in survival analysis. Definitions of all covariates and the literature that justifies 
their inclusion in the model are presented in Table 1.  
 
‘Insert Table 1 here’ 
 
 
Summary statistics for all variables are reported in Table A1 in the Appendix. Our main variables 
of interest are TI and CV measures of diversity; and the interactions of the latter with firm-level R&D 
intensity defined as the ratio of R&D expenditures to turnover. The correlation between TI and CV is 
0.44 for firm sizes and 0.37 for firm ages and significant, but their correlation with the Herfindahl index 
is low and statistically insignificant. The latter property reduces the risk of collinearity and indicates 
that the informational contents of intra-industry concentration and size/age diversity measures do reflect 
different ecosystem properties. TI, CV and their interactions with R&D intensity enable us to test for 
H1 and H2 proposed above.  
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We control for direct effects of R&D intensity in line with prior literature, which tends to adopt a 
linear specification but report conflicting findings. Although survival-enhancing effects of innovation 
are reported more frequently, Ugur et al. (2016a) demonstrate that a quadratic specification could be 
more plausible both theoretically and empirically, and this relationship was empirically confirmed by 
Sharapov et al. (2011) and by Zhang and Mohnen (2013). This is why we control for both R&D intensity 
and squared value.  
Another set of firm characteristics that have been investigated in the survival literature consists of 
firm age and size. Both theoretical and empirical work indicates that age and size are correlated 
positively with survival, even though the relationship may not be monotonic (Geroski, 1995; Klette and 
Kortum, 2004; Aghion et al., 2013). We control for age and size in line with existing work; but also to 
disentangle the direct effect of age or size on exit hazard for the effect of age or size diversity.  
Labour productivity and firm growth rate relative to industry growth are reported as significant 
determinants of firm survival (Audretsch, 1991, 1995; Hopenhayn, 1992; Ericson and Pakes, 1995; 
Mata, Portugal, Guimaraes, 1995; Cefis and Marsili, 2005; and Ugur et al., 2016a). The fourth set of 
firm-level characteristics includes number of plants, whether the firm is engaged in civil R&D only, 
and domestic versus foreign ownership. Inclusion of these observable characteristics in a hazard model 
is consistent with Audretsch (1991), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995), Mata et al. (1995), Fernandes 
and Paunov (2015), and Sharapov, Kattuman, and Sena (2011).  
Of the industry-level covariates, the effect of entry rate has been studied by Baldwin and 
Rafiquzzaman (1995) who reported that higher entry rates tend to reduce firm survival. Positive 
association between entry and exit rates at the industry level has been reported by Dunne et al. (1988) 
and Sidney et al. (2003). The effect of market concentration also varies but it tends to insignificant (see 
Baldwin and Rafiquzzaman, 1995; McCloughan and Stone, 1998; Ugur et al., 2016a).  
We control for average number of firm employees at 3-digit SIC industry level in order to address 
the risk of omitted variable bias, particularly when the coefficient of variation is used as diversity 
measure. We also control for median R&D intensity in the industry to verify whether higher level of 
creative destruction affects firm mortality (Aghion et al., 2013; Fernandes and Paunov (2015); Ugur et 
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al., 2016a). Finally, we check if technology classes matter using the Pavitt (1984) taxonomy.5 The final 
set of covariates relates to macro-level indicators such as onsets of financial crises, real effective 
exchange rate of the British pound, and GDP growth. Whilst currency appreciation may affect mortality 
because of decline in international cost competitiveness, the crisis dummy accounts for changes in the 
business and credit environment. Finally, GDP growth captures the effect of business cycle on firm 
survival (Goudie and Meeks, 1991; Bhattacharjee et al., 2009; Ugur et al., 2016).  
 
Estimation methodology 
Our estimation methodology follows Wooldridge (2010) on grouped duration data, where firm exit 
time is known within one year. The discrete-time hazard rate ℎ௜௧ that firm i exits in Te years 
conditional on survival for Te-1 years can be expressed as conditional probability of firm survival for 
௜ܶ years as follows:  
ℎ௜௧= 
ౌ౨(೅೐షభ ಬ ೅೔ ರ ೅೐)
ౌ౨ (೅೔ ಭ ೅೐షభ)
         (3) 
Bauer and Agarwal (2014: 432) provide evidence that discrete-time hazard models are “superior 
to the alternatives” in the context of estimating bankruptcy hazards. The parameters are estimated by 
maximizing the logarithm of the likelihood function. Whereas the Logit specification assumes a logistic 
distribution for the hazard, the Probit assumes a standard Normal distribution. Given the panel structure 
of the data we choose random effect estimations as it helps to correct for omitted variable bias 
(Fernandes and Paunov, 2015), whereas fixed-effect estimations often lead to large biases in all 
estimated parameters with relatively small number of periods in the dataset due to incidental parameters 
problem (Lancaster, 2000; Wooldridge, 2010, Bester and Hansen, 2009). The dependent variable is an 
indicator taking the value of 1 if the firm exits in year Te, and zero otherwise. To partially eliminate 
                                                          
5 Pavitt technology classes are from Pavitt (1984), as revised slightly by Bogliacino and Pianta (2010). Pavitt1 
consists of firms in science-based industries such as chemicals, office machinery, precision, medical and optical 
instruments industries, ICT. Pavitt2 includes specialized suppliers of technology - mechanical engineering 
industries, manufacturers of electrical machinery, equipment, etc. Pavitt3 includes scale-intensive industries such 
as pulp and paper, transport vehicles, mineral oil refining industries. Pavitt4 includes industries dominated by 
external suppliers of technology, e.g., textiles & clothing, food & drink, fabricated metals. Finally, Pavitt5 consists 
of unclassified industries. 
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competing causal attributions, we use one-year forwarded firm exit as our dependent variable (see 
model 2 above).  
The panel random-effect model estimators control for unobserved firm heterogeneity. Geroski, 
Mata, Portugal (2010) emphasize the importance of such control. Wooldridge (2010) demonstrates that 
a √ܰ  consistent estimator in this case, the population-averaged parameters, can be obtained by 
maximization of the log-likelihood function ݈݋݃ ܮ: 
݈݋݃ ܮ = ∑ ∑ {ݕ௜௧݈݋்݃௘௧ୀଵே௜ୀଵ ℎ௜௧+(1- ݕ௜௧)݈݋݃ (1 − ℎ௜௧)}      (4) 
For the random effects model the maximum log-likelihood estimations are based on Gauss-
Hermite quadrature approximation (see Naylor and Smith, 1982) with a corresponding probability 
distribution hazard function Pr(z). To check for robustness, we use both non-proportional hazard 
functions (Logit and Probit) and the proportional specification through Complementary log-log (Clog-
log). Although Jenkins (1995) notes that both estimators tend to converge when hazard rates are small, 
it is appropriate to use both types of estimators as the hazard functions are not known ex ante.  
Typical distribution specification for the random-effects estimators are given by the standard 
Normal Ф cumulative density functions in (5a)-(5c) (Wooldridge, 2010): 
Probit: Pr(z)=Ф(ݖ) = Ф(ݔ௜௧ߚ + ܯ௜௧ାଵߙ + ݒ௜ + ߛ௧ାଵ + ߝ௜௧ାଵ)    (5a) 
Logit: Pr(z) = 1 (1 + ݁ݔ݌(−ݖ))⁄        (5b) 
In the complementary log-log random-effects estimator, the conditional probability function is 
given by Clog-log: ܲݎ(ݖ) = 1 − ݁ݔ݌ (− ݁ݔ݌(ݖ))     (5c) 
We use likelihood ratio test to check if the panel random-effects estimators deliver similar results 
with pooled estimators, i.e. if panel level variance is insignificant and the ratio ߩ = ഑ೡమ
഑ഄమశ഑ೡమ
  is different 
from zero by sampling chance6. We also use robust standard errors of the estimated parameters, which 
provide consistency when the disturbances are not correlated across firms. 
Importantly, in nonlinear models the interaction effect is not equivalent to the marginal effect, i.e. 
the sign of the estimated parameter for the interaction term between R&D intensity and diversity can 
be misleading (Norton et al. 2004). We numerically estimate the interaction effects by using margins 
                                                          
6 Stata reports panel level variance ln(ߪ௩ଶ) in form of lnsig2u_const. 
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(Williams, 2012) and inteff (Norton, Wang, Ai,(2004) procedures in Stata based on delta approximation 
method applied to the Probit model, which is selected by the AIC and BIC information criteria. In this 
model, the interaction effect for the conditional mean of the dummy variable y is:  
E[y|ݔଵ, ݔଶ, X] = ߔ(ߙଵݔଵ௧ + ߙଶݔଶ௧ + ߙଵଶݔଵ௧ݔଶ௧ + ݔ௝௧ߙ௝) =  ߔ(ݖ)    (6) 
According to Norton et al. (2004), the full marginal effect of the interaction term on the conditional 
mean survival is: 
డమః(௭)
డ௫భ௫మ
= [ߙଵଶ − (ߙଵ + ߙଵଶݔଶ)(ߙଶ + ߙଵଶݔଵ)ݖ] ߔᇱ(ݖ)    (7) 
Hence, the marginal effect of the interaction term depends on specific levels of all covariates. We 
also report graphical representations of the estimated interaction effects following Greene’s (2010) 
recommendation for nonlinear models.  
 
Results 
Our results are based on the list of variables summarised in Table A1 in the Appendix, where we provide 
separate summary statistics for exiting firms, survivors and full sample.  Our sample consist of 35,136 
R&D-active firms observed from 1998-2012, of which 28,287 firms are survivors and 6,849 firms exit 
over the analysis period. We report results form a wide range of discrete-time hazard models: pooled 
Probit, pooled Logit, pooled Complementary log-log (Clog-log) and their panel random-effects versions. 
We present the preferred estimation results in the main text; and the additional sensitivity/robustness 
checks in the Appendix. The preferred estimation results are determined by AIC/BIC values, which 
point in favour pooled Probit compared to pooled Logit or pooled Clog-log; and in favour of random-
effects Probit estimator compared to random-effects Logit or Clog-log.  
Table 2 reports the results from pooled probit and random-effects probit estimations for both 
measures of size diversity: the Theil entropy index (columns 1 and 2) and the coefficient of variation 
(columns 3 and 4) of employment.  Results from other pooled and panel estimators are reported in Table 
A2a (with the Theil entropy index of employment) and A2b (with the coefficient of variation of 
employment) in the Appendix. We have also conducted a likelihood ratio (LR) test to check whether 
the panel random-effects estimators are preferable to pooled estimators as they allow for taking account 
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of unobserved firm heterogeneity. The test favours the random-effects estimators, which we use to 
obtain non-linear interaction effects marginal effects for R&D intensity and diversity (Table 3) and 
conditional effects depending on different levels of R&D intensity (Table 4).7  
 
‘Insert Table 2 here’ 
 
 
Post-estimation results for pooled Probit (bottom three rows in Table 2) indicate that: (i) the model 
fits the data well as the Pearson χ2 does not reject the null hypothesis of good fit; (ii) the overall rate of 
correct classification is high: 95.66 percent in the estimation based on the Theil index and 95.67 percent 
in the estimation with the coefficient of variation respectively; and (iii) the model has good power to 
discriminate between exiting and surviving firm as the area under the ROC curve is 0.69 and 0.68, 
respectively. In addition, there is a high degree of sign and significance consistency across six estimators 
and two diversity measures (compare Tables 2, A2a, and A2b). The consistency is evident with respect 
to covariates of main interest (diversity measures, their interactions with R&D intensity, and the latter’s 
linear and quadratic terms) and the wide range of controls discussed in Table 1. Furthermore, estimation 
results based on age as the diversity measure (reported in Table A3 in the Appendix) are consistent with 
the findings based on size diversity and across two diversity measures: the Theil entropy index and the 
coefficient of variation.  
The evidence we report provides strong evidential support for H1, which postulates that higher 
levels of intra-industry size diversity are associated with higher levels of exit hazard. The coefficient 
estimates are significant at 1 percent in preferred estimations and in others reported as robustness checks. 
This finding is observed after controlling for firm size and its square, and for the mean employment in 
the industry. Hence, the intra-industry size diversity is an exit hazard in its own right. We must also 
indicate that this finding is obtained after controlling for firm size and mean size in the industry in order 
to minimize the risk of bias due to the left-tail sensitivity of the Theil index and the omitted variable 
                                                          
7 Preferred estimation results of age diversity and exit hazards are presented in Table A3 in the Appendix. 
The results are fully consistent with those based size diversity. Therefore, results from pooled logit and 
clog-log and form their panel equivalents are not reported to save space. Also LR test results are not 
reported here for the same reason. However, all these results but can be provided on request. 
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bias that may be caused by the coefficient of variation (Stirling, 2010; Solanas et al., 2012). True the 
parameter estimates for the Theil entropy index are larger than those of the coefficient of variation. This, 
however, is to be expected because the mean of the coefficient of variation in the sample is 5.0 compared 
to a mean Theil index of 1.9. Stated differently, the parameter estimates for the diversity measures are 
consistent in terms of sign have comparable magnitudes when the scale of the diversity measures are 
taken into account.  
The negative and statistically-significant parameter estimates for the interaction between diversity 
and R&D intensity lend support to H2, which posits that higher levels of R&D investment 
counterbalance the hazard-increasing effects of diversity. However, we take account of the non-linear 
nature of the hazard estimators and obtain numerical estimates of the parameter using margins and inteff 
procedures in Stata (Norton et al., 2004; Williams, 2012). We also provide graphical representations of 
the estimated interaction effects following Greene’s (2010) recommendation for nonlinear models.  
Drawing on Greene (2010), we present in Figure 2 the sign and significance of the interaction 
effects from the Probit model. The horizontal axis indicates the predicted probability of exit whereas 
the vertical axis indicates the associated Z-statistics. The horizontal lines above and below zero 
demarcates the Z-values that corresponds to statistical significance at 5%. It can be seen that the 
parameter estimate for the interaction term are always associated with negative Z-statistics 
(confirming the negative effect on exit hazard) and the Z-statistics are almost always below the 
demarcation line for significance. These graphical results lend support to H2, which stipulates that the 
interaction between diversity and R&D intensity ameliorates the adverse effect of diversity on 
survival.  
 
‘Insert Graph 2 here’ 
 
Table 3 provides further evidence that lends support to H2. Using the delta method and routines 
discussed in Norton et al., 2004 and Williams, 2012), we present numerical estimates of the marginal 
interaction effects in Table 3. The results indicate that the marginal effects are always negative and 
significant at mean values of all the covariates. When the full range of the covariate values are taken 
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into account, the marginal effects are predominantly negative and significant at least at 10% with the 
exception of the third row, where the marginal effect relates to interaction between R&D intensity and 
the coefficient of variation measure of size diversity.  
Hence we can safely conclude that intra-industry diversity and R&D intensity are substitutes in 
that an increase in R&D intensity reduces exit hazard at each level of diversity. Given that the 
interaction effect is significant after controlling for the direct effects of R&D intensity and diversity, it 
indicates that the optimal level of R&D intensity is higher in more diverse industries. This finding ties 
in with the descriptive evidence presented earlier and is in line with the active learning approach to 
R&D investment in Ericson and Pakes (1995). R&D investment ameliorates the adverse effects of intra-
industry diversity on survival by: (i) increasing the scope for discovering, reconfiguring, and developing 
capacities (Anderson and Tushman, 2001; Audretsch et al., 2004; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Probst 
and Raisch, 2005; and Teece, 2007); (ii) facilitating adaptation to shifts in the technology regime 
(Nelson, 1995); or (iii) enabling firms to keep up with shifts in the technology frontier (Aghion et al., 
2013; Ugur et al., 2016).  
 
‘Insert Table 3 here’ 
 
The results from the preferred estimators and samples above are strongly consistent with findings 
from a battery of sensitivity checks, including results form: (i) alternative pooled and panel hazard 
estimators (Table A2a and A2b); (ii) different cut-off points for R&D intensity; (iii) stepwise 
regressions; (iv) samples that avoid left truncation by investigating firms born in 2000 or 2003 and after; 
(v) samples that exclude firms in the financial and defence industries. Most of these results are not 
presented here to save space, but they can be provided on request.  
It must also be noted that the results discussed above are highly consistent with those we obtain 
when age variation is used as a measure of intra-industry type diversity (see Table A3 in the Appendix). 
Using both the Theil index and coefficient of variation measures of age diversity, we find a positive 
relationship between intra-industry age diversity and exit hazard. Our findings indicate that there is a 
strong case for taking diversity seriously as a predictor of firm mortality. The relationship between 
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diversity and mortality is driven by shallow fitness distributions and higher probabilities of settling on 
sub-optimal fitness peaks. This characteristic of the fitness landscape in diverse industries indicates that 
industry evolution is as much about selection in favour of the fittest as the result of uncertainty about 
the globally optimal fitness is.  
In the following paragraphs we discuss the findings concerning the wide range of controls that 
capture the hazard-related factors at the firm, industry and macro levels. First, we confirm the 
diminishing scale effect in the relationship between R&D intensity and survival reported earlier in Ugur 
et al. (2016a). We find a U-shaped relationship between R&D intensity and exit hazard: as R&D 
intensity increases exit hazard falls at increasingly slower rates, with a turning point beyond which 
increased R&D intensity increases exit hazard. The diminishing scale effect can be due to increased 
riskiness of R&D investments at higher levels of R&D intensity (Ericson and Pakes, 1995; Czarnitzki 
and Toole, 2013). Secondly, R&D-active firms may fail to diversify their revenue streams at the same 
pace as their investment in R&D (Fernandes and Paunov, 2015; Ugur et al., 2016a).  
Our findings for the remaining controls are in line with the theoretical and empirical literature, 
which indicates that new entrants have shorter survival time, but those that survive grow faster and 
survive longer (Klette and Kortum, 2004; Aghion et al., 2013; Cefis and Marsili, 2005; and Evans, 1987 
among others). The U-shaped relationship between size and exit hazard we report is in line with 
evidence on size distribution and survival among Portuguese firms (Cabral and Mata, 2003), which 
suggests that a large size beyond an efficient scale may be a hazard factor in firm dynamics. By 
controlling for the direct effect of size and demonstrating that the direct effect on survival is non-
monotonic, we lend added credence to our findings about diversity. Stated differently, our findings 
concerning the adverse effects of diversity on survival are not mimicking the higher hazard rates among 
small firms.  
Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) and Fernandes and Paunov (2015), we report that multi-plant 
firms are less likely to exit as they are better able to diversify risk and restructure.  We also report that 
firm productivity (real turnover per employee) and growth rates relative to median growth in the 
industry are associated with lower exit hazard. These findings are in line with Doms et al. (1995), Mata 
et al. (1995), and Griliches and Regev (1995) among others.  
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Of the industry-level covariates, we report that the relationship between exit hazard and market 
concentration is insignificant. This is in line with prior studies, which offer the following explanations: 
(i) market concentration may be less important than market niches in determining monopoly rents 
(Geroski, 1995; Wagner, 1994); (ii) entry costs associated with concentrated industries depend on 
actions of hypercompetitive and less predictable firms, but not on the number of companies 
(concentration) in an industry; and (iii) industries with similar concentration ratios often show 
significant variation in the overall firm-size distribution (Carroll, 1985: 1264).  
Four Pavitt classes are associated with lower exist hazard relative to the excluded class (Pavitt 4), 
which consists of firms that depend on import of technology from other industries. This result is in line 
with Agarwal and Audretsch (2001) and Cefis and Marsili (2005), who indicate that the nature of the 
technology in the industry matters. Our finding concerning the effect of the average R&D intensity in 
the industry (as a proxy for intra-industry creative destruction) suggests that exit hazard increases as 
creative destruction increases confirming the Schumpeterian innovation models (Aghion et al., 2013; 
Fernandes and Paunov, 2015; Ugur et al., 2016).  
With respect to macroeconomic variables, we report that real currency appreciation (reduced 
competitiveness) and the onset of a financial crisis tend to increase exit hazard; whereas annual GDP 
growth rates have a negative relationship with exit hazard. These findings are in line with those reported 
in prior survival studies that control for macroeconomic variables (Bhattacharjee et al., 2009; Goudie 
and Meeks, 1991; Ugur et al., 2016).   
The final set of evidence we present here has significant implications for organisational strategy 
because it sheds light on the levels of R&D intensity required to counter-balance and eventually reverse 
the hazard-increasing effect of diversity. In Table 4 below we present the effects of the diversity on exit 
hazard conditional on different levels of R&D intensity. Fixing the covariates at their sample means, 
we varied the level of R&D intensity from the bottom 5th to the top 95th percentile values. The results 
indicate that the hazard-increasing effect of diversity declines as R&D intensity increases. The adverse 
effect due to firm-size diversity becomes insignificant between the 70th and 75th percentiles (at R&D 
intensity of approximately 9–11% of firm turnover) and is eventually reversed at the top R&D intensity. 
In the case of age diversity, the adverse effect is diluted significantly as R&D intensity increases but it 
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is never neutralised or reversed. This finding indicates that R&D investment does indeed reduce the 
exit hazard associated with diversity but it is more effective in providing a shield against the adverse 
effects of size diversity compared to that of age diversity.  
 
‘Insert Table 4 here’ 
 
Conclusions  
In this paper, we have addressed two novel research questions: (i) does intra-industry size and age 
diversity constitute a hazard factor for firms beyond the direct effect of size and age as such? (ii) does 
firm investment in R&D moderate the effect of diversity on exit hazard by enabling the firm to increase 
competencies in dealing with complexity in diverse industries? We have provided a wealth of evidence 
that justifies affirmative answers to both questions. The hazard-increasing effects of age and size 
diversity and a moderating indirect effect associated with R&D intensity are evident and consistent 
across six discrete-time hazard estimators applied to four different samples and two diversity measures. 
Our findings are informed by and has the potential for unifying insights on industry diversity and 
learning from four areas of study: theoretical biology, organizational ecology, industrial organisation 
and game theory. The findings lend consistent support to the hypotheses we derive from a carefully 
distilled synthesis of those insights. On the one hand, we demonstrate that intra-industry type (age or 
size) diversity increases the complexity of the opportunity/fitness landscape and thereby leads to higher 
likelihood of suboptimal choices and exit hazard. On the other hand, we found that firms in more diverse 
industries do invest more in R&D to better learn and develop competencies to cope with heterogeneous 
rivals’ responses under the conditions of rugged fitness landscapes and bounded rationality. Therefore 
we argue that intra-industry diversity is an important indicator of complexity that should be analysed 
and modelled in the study of industry evolution and firm dynamics. The implication for business 
decision making is that firms in diverse industries should select their R&D investment levels not only 
on the basis of its direct effects on firm survival (which is non-monotonic) but also in the light of 
existing age and size diversity in the industry. Due to active-learning effects within diverse industries, 
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R&D investment does reduce exit hazard and may eventually enable the firm to neutralise the adverse 
effect of diversity on survival.   
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Panel a: Theil index as measure of size and age diversity 
 
 
 
Panel b: Coefficient of variation as measure of size and age diversity 
  
Figure 1: Intra-industry size/age diversity and survival times. 
Note: Theil index, coefficient of variation and survival times are averages at the 3-digit industry level. 
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Panel a: Theil index as measure of size and age diversity 
 
 
Panel b: Coefficient of variation as measure of size and age diversity 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Measures of within-industry size/age diversity and R&D intensity. 
Note: Coefficient of variation, survival times and R&D intensity are averages at the 3-digit industry 
level.  
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2a. Theil entropy of firm employment.     2b. Coefficient of variation of firm employment. 
 
  
 
       2c. Coefficient of variation of firm ages.       2d. Theil entropy of firm ages. 
 
Figure 3: The estimated interaction effects between logarithm of R&D intensity and (a) Theil 
entropy of firm employment, (b) coefficient of variation of firm employment, (c) coefficient of 
variation of firm ages, and (d) Theil entropy of firm ages. 
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Table 1: Covariates and expected effects on exit hazard 
Covariate 
Description (expected sign of 
effect on exit hazard) Related literature 
Covariates of main interest 
Firm-size and age 
diversity  
(TI. or C.V.) 
Theil’s entropy (TI) and 
coefficient of variation (CV) of 
firm employment or age in 3-
digit industries (+) 
Size diversity is not tested before for firm 
survival, cohort diversity is tested by Hansen 
and Barnett (1996) and Barnett (2008) 
Interactions 
TI*log(R&Dint.+1), 
CV*log(R&Dint.+1) 
Interaction of firm size and age 
diversity measures with firm 
R&D intensity (-) 
Not tested before for firm survival 
Other firm-level covariates 
R&D intensity 
Ln(R&Dint.+1) 
 
Logarithm of firm R&D 
intensity (-) 
 
Aghion et al. (2013); Ericson and Pakes 
(1995)  
 Ln(R&Dint.+1) sq. Squared logarithm of R&D 
intensity  (+) 
Aghion et al. (2013); Ericson and Pakes 
(1995); Sharapov et al. (2011); Zhang and 
Mohnen (2013), Ugur et al. (2016a). 
Age  
log(firm Age) 
Logarithm of firm age in years 
(-) 
Hopenhayn (1992); Ericson and Pakes 
(1995); Geroski, 1995; Cefis and Marsili 
(2005); Doms et al. (1995); Disney et al. 
(2003) 
Age squared 
log(firm Age) sq. 
Squared logarithm of firm age 
(+) 
Agarwal and Gort (2002); Ericson and Pakes 
(1995); Cefis and Marsili (2005); Evans 
(1987) 
Size 
Ln(Employment) 
 
 
Logarithm of firm employees  (-) 
 
Hopenhayn (1992); Ericson and Pakes 
(1995); Geroski, 1995; Cefis and Marsili 
(2005); Doms et al. (1995); Disney et al. 
(2003) 
Size squared 
Ln(Empl.) squared 
Squared log. of firm employees  
(+) 
Bhattacharjee et al. (2009); Cefis and Marsili 
(2005) 
Local units 
Ln(Plants) 
Logarithm of firm’s local units 
(plants) (+) 
Audretsch and Mahmood (1995); Fernandes 
and Paunov (2015); Audretsch (1991); 
Griliches and Regev (1995); Mata et al. 
(1995) 
Productivity 
Ln(Rturn./empl.) 
Logarithm of deflated turnover 
per employee (-) 
Audretsch, 1991; Hopenhayn (1992); 
Ericson and Pakes (1995) 
Growth differential 
(Growth_dmed) 
Growth rate of firms’ deflated 
turnover minus median industry 
growth rate (-) 
Audretsch, 1991; Hopenhayn (1992); 
Ericson and Pakes (1995); Cefis and Marsili 
(2005); Mata et al. (1995), Audretsch (1995), 
Ugur et al. (2016a) 
Civil R&D 
(Civilian R&D only) 
Dummy variable indicating that 
firm is engaged in civilian R&D 
only (+/ -) 
Ugur et al. (2016a), Sharapov et al. (2011) 
UK-owned 
(UK owned) 
Dummy variable indicating that 
firm is UK-owned (+ /-) 
Ugur et al. (2016a), Sharapov et al. (2011) 
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Industry covariates 
Concentration 
Herfhindahl index  
Herfindahl-Hirschman index of 
firm shares in industry turnover 
at 3-digit industry level (+/-) 
McCloughan and Stone (1998); Baldwin and 
Rafiquzzaman (1995); Wagner (1994); 
Geroski (1995) 
Pavitt technology 
class*  
(Pavitt #) 
Dummy variables for Pavitt 
classes 1 to 5, excluded category 
is Pavitt 4 (+/-)  
Pavitt (1984); Agarwal and Audretsch 
(2001); Cefis and Marsili (2005), Ugur et al. 
(2016a) 
 
Entry rate 
log(% entry rate) 
Logarithm of firm entry rate (in 
%) at 3-digit SIC industry level 
(+) 
Hannan and Freeman (1989); Fernandes 
and Paunov (2015) 
Median industry 
R&D intensity 
Ln(Med. R&D int.) 
Logarithm of industry median 
ratio of total R&D to turnover at 
3-digit SIC level (-) 
Audretsch and Mahmood (1995); 
Fernandes and Paunov (2015), Ugur et 
al. (2016a) 
Average firm size in 
the industry 
Ln(Mean empl.) 
Logarithm of average employees 
per firm in 3-digit SIC industry 
level (+/-)  
Fernandes and Paunov (2015); 
Mata and Portugal (2002); Audretsch et 
al. (2004) 
 
Macroeconomic indicators 
Crisis year (crisis) A dummy variable equal 1 for 
the Asian crisis year of 1998; 
dot.com bubble crisis of 2001; 
and the recent financial crisis in 
2008 (+) 
Ugur et al. (2016a); Bhattacharjee et al. 
(2009) report higher hazard rates in 
periods of crises 
Average real 
effective exchange 
rate (Areer) 
Average effective exchange rate 
against a basket of currencies - 
an increases in Areer indicates 
appreciation (+)  
Bhattacharjee et al. (2009); Goudie and 
Meeks (1991)  
GDP growth rate 
 
Growth rate of GDP, annual %  
(-) 
Business cycle literature; Thompson 
(2005) for industry output, Mata and 
Portugal (2002) for employment growth 
Note: * Pavitt technology classes are from Pavitt (1984), as revised slightly by Bogliacino and Pianta 
(2010). Pavitt1 consists of firms in science-based industries such as chemicals, office machinery, 
precision, medical and optical instruments industries, ICT. Pavitt2 includes specialized suppliers of 
technology - mechanical engineering industries, manufacturers of electrical machinery, equipment, etc. 
Pavitt3 includes scale-intensive industries such as pulp and paper, transport vehicles, mineral oil 
refining industries. Pavitt4 includes industries dominated by technology suppliers, e.g., textiles & 
clothing, food & drink, fabricated metals. Finally, Pavitt5 consists of unclassified industries. 
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Table 2: Intra-industry firm size diversity and exit hazard: Preferred estimators 
 
 Theil entropy index Coefficient of variation 
Dependent variable: exit in year t+1 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Size Diversity 0.0377*** 0.0398*** 0.0103*** 0.0112*** 
 (0.0109) (0.0116) (0.0030) (0.0032) 
Size Diversity*log(R&Dint.+1) -0.244*** -0.247*** -0.0581*** -0.0588*** 
 (0.0588) (0.0617) (0.0143) (0.0149) 
Log(R&Dint.+1) -0.578*** -0.599*** -0.755*** -0.779*** 
 (0.200) (0.205) (0.181) (0.185) 
Log(R&Dint.+1) sq. 1.250*** 1.266*** 1.274*** 1.290*** 
 (0.271) (0.282) (0.272) (0.283) 
Log(firm Age) -0.222*** -0.214*** -0.222*** -0.215*** 
 (0.0107) (0.0114) (0.0107) (0.0114) 
Log(Employment) -0.197*** -0.217*** -0.197*** -0.218*** 
 (0.0121) (0.0137) (0.0121) (0.0137) 
Log(Employm.) sq. 0.0191*** 0.0209*** 0.0191*** 0.0209*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0017) (0.0019) 
Log(Real turnover /  -0.0992*** -0.104*** -0.0993*** -0.104*** 
employees) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079) (0.0079) 
Firm growth relative  -0.0674*** -0.0681*** -0.0674*** -0.0681*** 
to industry median growth (0.0102) (0.0096) (0.0102) (0.0096) 
Log(Plants) -0.0226 -0.0202 -0.0211 -0.0186 
 (0.0157) (0.0162) (0.0157) (0.0162) 
Civil R&D only -0.0920*** -0.0951*** -0.0925*** -0.0957*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0138) (0.0130) (0.0138) 
UK-owned -0.0672*** -0.0723*** -0.0665*** -0.0717*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0222) (0.0211) (0.0222) 
Log(% entry rate) -0.0673 -0.0743 -0.0595 -0.0643 
 (0.0595) (0.0629) (0.0599) (0.0635) 
Log(Mean industry  0.0160** 0.0152* 0.0193** 0.0187** 
employment ) (0.0079) (0.0085) (0.0078) (0.0083) 
Log(Median R&D int. 0.633*** 0.647*** 0.630*** 0.642*** 
in industry) (0.114) (0.120) (0.112) (0.119) 
Herfindahl index -0.0434 -0.0540 -0.0387 -0.0503 
 (0.0614) (0.0651) (0.0602) (0.0642) 
Pavitt 1 -0.0637*** -0.0578** -0.0656*** -0.0608*** 
 (0.0216) (0.0232) (0.0220) (0.0235) 
Pavitt 2 -0.101*** -0.103*** -0.101*** -0.104*** 
 (0.0181) (0.0195) (0.0182) (0.0195) 
Pavitt 3 -0.0253 -0.0218 -0.0264 -0.0228 
 (0.0234) (0.0252) (0.0234) (0.0251) 
Pavitt 5 -0.0494* -0.0539** -0.0463* -0.0505* 
 (0.0257) (0.0274) (0.0257) (0.0274) 
Average effective real 0.0120*** 0.0119*** 0.0120*** 0.0119*** 
exchange rate (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Crisis dummy 0.0660*** 0.0620*** 0.0661*** 0.0622*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0159) (0.0154) (0.0160) 
GDP growth (%) -0.0250*** -0.0266*** -0.0251*** -0.0266*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0038) (0.0036) 
Constant -1.389*** -1.379*** -1.382*** -1.374*** 
 (0.116) (0.120) (0.116) (0.120) 
Log(ߪ௩ଶ)   -2.351***  -2.351*** 
   (0.0460)  (0.0462) 
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N 158,316 158,316 158,313 158,313 
AIC 53,695.9 53,704.9 53,692.6 53,701.1 
BIC 53,935.2 53,954.2 53,931.9 53950.4 
Log-likelihood -26,824.0 -26,827.4 -26,822.3 -26,825.6 
chi2 2,712.0 2,466.3 2,710.4 2,464.3 
3-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Correctly classified 95.66% N/A 95.67% N/A 
p > Pearson χ2 0.98 N/A 0.81 N/A 
Area under ROC curve 0.69 N/A 0.68 N/A 
Notes: Top R&D intensity is less than 1. Estimators: (1) and (3) – pooled Probit; (2) and (4) – panel 
Probit with random effects. The dependent variable is one-year-forward exit indicator, which takes the 
value of 1 if firm exits in year t+1, and zero otherwise. For definitions of Pavitt technology classes. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The number of firms 
in the estimation sample is 35,136. N/A: not applicable. 
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Table 3.  Numerical estimations of the non-linear interaction effects in the estimated Probit random 
effects models.  
 
Interaction indicator Marginal effect 
at mean values 
by delta method 
(Std.Err.) 
Z-stat. 
(st.dev) 
[95% 
Confidence 
interval] for 
the marginal 
effect 
Range of estimated 
interaction effects and  
their Z-statistics  
Ln(R&D 
intensity*Theil index 
of firms’ age 
-.104**   
 (.050) 
-2.949*** 
(.275) 
[-.203;-.006] Effects: [-.539; -.007] 
Z-stat.: [-6.240; -1.956] 
Ln(R&D intensity*-
Coefficient of 
variation of firms’ 
age 
-.047*** 
(.028) 
-2.515*** 
(.2387)  
[-.104;-.008] Effects: [-.244; -.003] 
Z-stat.: [-5.454; -1.786] 
Ln(R&D intensity*-
Coeff. of variation of 
firms’ employment  
-.004*** 
(.001) 
-3.240*** 
(.192) 
[-.006;-.002] Effects:  [-.016;-.0001] 
Z-stat.:  [-5.069;  -1.535] 
 
Ln(R&D intensity*-
Theil index of firms’ 
employment 
-.019*** 
(.004) 
-3.393*** 
(.213) 
[-.028;-.010] Effects: [-.071; -.001] 
Z-stat.: [-5.157; -1.789] 
Note: R&D intensity is less than one. Number of observations: 158,313; number of firms: 35,570. 
Standard errors are in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table 4. Conditional effects of the intra-industry size and age diversity on exit hazard depending on R&D 
intensity  
Percentile 
of R&D 
intensity  
R&D 
intensity 
Marginal effects 
at mean Theil 
entropy of firm 
employment 
Marginal effects at 
mean coefficient of 
variation of firm 
employment  
Marginal effects 
at mean Theil 
entropy of firm 
ages 
Marginal effects 
at mean coef-
ficient of vari-
ation of firm ages 
5 .0009         .0395*** 
(.0116) 
.0111 *** 
(.0032) 
.9255*** 
(.1302) 
.4819*** 
(.0704) 
15 .0049   .0385*** 
(.0116) 
.0108*** 
(.0032) 
.9181*** 
(.1302) 
.4781*** 
(.0704) 
25 .0101   .0373*** 
(.0116) 
.0105***  
(.0032) 
.9085*** 
(.1302) 
.4733*** 
(.0704) 
35 .0169 .0356*** 
(.0116) 
.0101***  
(.0032) 
.8958*** 
(.1302) 
.4669*** 
(.0704) 
45 .0261 .0334***  
(.0116) 
.0096*** 
(.0032) 
.8786*** 
(.1302) 
.4582*** 
(.0704) 
55 .0404 .0298 *** 
(.0116) 
.0087*** 
(.0032) 
.8518*** 
(.1302) 
.4446*** 
(.0704) 
65 .0656  .0236** 
(.0116) 
.0073** 
(.0032) 
.8047*** 
(.1302) 
.4209*** 
(.0704) 
70 .0859 .0186 
(.0116) 
.0061* 
(.0032) 
.7668*** 
(.1302) 
.4017*** 
(.0704) 
75 .1122 .0121 
(.0116) 
.0045  
(.0032) 
.7176*** 
(.1302) 
.3768*** 
(.0704) 
80 .1467 .0036    
(.0116) 
.0026 
(.0032) 
.6532*** 
(.1302) 
.3443*** 
(.0704) 
85 .1927  -.0077 
(.0116) 
-.0001  
(.0032) 
.5672*** 
(.1302) 
.3008*** 
(.0704) 
95 .3812  -.0542*** 
(.0116) 
-.0112*** 
(.0032) 
.2149* 
(.1302) 
.1227* 
(0704) 
Note: Other covariates are taken at their mean. Standard errors are in parentheses. Top R&D intensity 
is less than one. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Conditional effects are based on estimations from 
panel (random-effect) probit model, reported in columns 2 and 4 of Table 2 above. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Summary statistics 
 Survival firms Exiter firms Full sample 
 mean st.d. mean st.d. mean st.d. 
Theil entropy (TI) 1.8428 0.8095 2.0504 0.8489 1.8632 0.8155 
lrdint_theil 0.1917 0.3379 0.2707 0.3932 0.1992 0.3442 
empl_cv 4.8792 3.0757 5.6944 3.4126 4.9610 3.1215 
empl_cv_lrnd 0.5729 1.1047 0.8235 1.2988 0.5970 1.1262 
Theil entropy ages (TI age) 0.1902 0.0806 0.2164 0.0878 0.1875 0.0795 
lrdint_theil_age 0.0272 0.0536 0.0385 0.0632 0.0259 0.0520 
age_cv (CV age) 0.5975 0.1489 0.6471 0.1578 0.5923 0.1473 
age_cv_lrnd 0.0790 0.1461 0.1101 0.1722 0.0753 0.1418 
lenterate 0.6409 0.0967 0.6327 0.0999 0.6399 0.0980 
lrdint 0.0858 0.1247 0.0812 0.1440 0.0830 0.1270 
lrdint2 0.0224 0.0623 0.0213  0.0751 0.0215 0.0637 
Log (age + 1) 2.6522 0.6810 2.1294 0.7415 2.6077 0.6244 
Log (employment + 1) 3.0155 1.6735 2.3002 1.6126 2.9451 1.6887 
Log employment squared 11.8941 12.0226 7.8913 10.2346 11.5252 11.9818 
Log (live local units + 1) 0.6941 0.5670 0.5182 0.5503 0.6719 0.5706 
Productivity: (LogRturn_empl) 4.3776 .9846 4.0777 1.0315 4.3492 0.9949 
growth_dmed 0.0489 0.5867 -0.0297 0.7227 0.0430 0.6063 
mean_empl 145.889 505.678 133.277 491.224 145.548 518.905 
herfindahl 0.0982 0.1082 0.0967 0.1051 0.0982 0.1080 
civil_dummy  0.4304 0.4951 0.3501 0.4770 0.4248 0.4943 
uk_owner 0.8747 0.3310 0.9272 0.2596 0.8787 0.3264 
RnDint_med 0.0836 0.1118 0.1201 0.1339 0.0973 0.1061 
lmean_empl 4.3838 0.9524 4.0748 1.0791 4.3635 0.9655 
lRnDint_med 0.0679 0.0882 0.0907 0.1045 0.0701 0.0902 
Pavitt1 0.3149 0.4644 0.3974  0.4894 0.3233 0.4677 
Pavitt2 0.2244  0.4171  0.2065 0.4049 0.2233 0.4164 
Pavitt3 0.1005 0.3007 0.0753 0.2639 0.0981 0.2975 
Pavitt5 0.0654 0.2473 0.0694 0.2543 0.0657 0.2478 
Average effective exchange  
rate index 
92.082 9.4775 93.931 9.1565 92.2903 9.4681 
dummy for crisis years: 1998, 
2001, and 2008 
0.1539 0.3608 0.1936 0.3952 0.1556 0.3625 
GDP growth rate, % 1.5457 2.1824 1.6766 2.3733 1.5571 2.1834 
Number of firms 
Observations/counts 
28,287 
151,467 
 6,849 
 
 35,136 
158,316 
 
* Note: minimum and maximum values are suppressed to comply with non-disclosure requirements of 
the data hosts, UK Data Service. Pavitt technology classes: 1 - science-based industries; 2 - specialised 
suppliers of technology; 3 - scale-intensive industries; 4 - industries dominated by suppliers of 
technology; 5 – unclassified. Onset of crisis dummy takes value of 1 if year is either 1998, 2001 or 2008. 
Turnover is deflated by 2-digt output deflator with base year at 2010. The Herfindahl index is based on 
firm turnover at 3-digit industry level. The GDP growth rate and the average effective real exchange 
rate are from the World Bank Development Indicators 2016 (www.data.worldbank.org/data-
catalog/world-development-indicators). 
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Table A2a. Theil index measure of intra-industry firm size diversity and exit hazard:  
Different estimators  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Theil size index (TI size) 0.0820*** 0.0793*** 0.0827*** 0.0795*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0234) (0.0243) (0.0235) 
TI size*log(R&Dint.+1) -0.522*** -0.500*** -0.522*** -0.499*** 
 (0.122) (0.116) (0.122) (0.115) 
Log(R&Dint.+1) -1.253*** -1.192*** -1.256*** -1.192*** 
 (0.428) (0.412) (0.430) (0.411) 
Log(R&Dint.+1) sq. 2.623*** 2.483*** 2.623*** 2.481*** 
 (0.568) (0.543) (0.570) (0.542) 
Log(firm Age) -0.463*** -0.444*** -0.459*** -0.442*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0224) (0.0237) (0.0230) 
Log(Employment) -0.426*** -0.412*** -0.432*** -0.415*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0256) (0.0282) (0.0270) 
Log(Employm.) sq. 0.0411*** 0.0398*** 0.0417*** 0.0400*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0038) 
Log(Real turnover /  -0.220*** -0.212*** -0.221*** -0.213*** 
employees) (0.0173) (0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0166) 
Firm growth relative  -0.136*** -0.127*** -0.136*** -0.126*** 
to industry median growth (0.0213) (0.0199) (0.0214) (0.0200) 
Log(Plants) -0.0656* -0.0662* -0.0637* -0.0654* 
 (0.0353) (0.0345) (0.0358) (0.0347) 
Civil R&D only -0.200*** -0.194*** -0.201*** -0.194*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0277) (0.0286) (0.0277) 
UK-owned -0.158*** -0.155*** -0.159*** -0.155*** 
 (0.0484) (0.0474) (0.0489) (0.0477) 
Log(% entry rate) -0.150 -0.146 -0.151 -0.146 
 (0.129) (0.125) (0.130) (0.126) 
Log(Mean industry  0.0364** 0.0352** 0.0358** 0.0349** 
employment ) (0.0173) (0.0167) (0.0172) (0.0165) 
Log(Median R&D int. 1.413*** 1.364*** 1.414*** 1.364*** 
in industry) (0.236) (0.225) (0.239) (0.226) 
Herfindahl index -0.0779 -0.0718 -0.0824 -0.0736 
 (0.137) (0.133) (0.138) (0.134) 
Pavitt 1 -0.142*** -0.139*** -0.140*** -0.138*** 
 (0.0478) (0.0464) (0.0486) (0.0469) 
Pavitt 2 -0.213*** -0.205*** -0.214*** -0.205*** 
 (0.0403) (0.0392) (0.0408) (0.0395) 
Pavitt 3 -0.0565 -0.0557 -0.0549 -0.0551 
 (0.0531) (0.0518) (0.0539) (0.0523) 
Pavitt 5 -0.116** -0.114** -0.118** -0.114** 
 (0.0558) (0.0540) (0.0561) (0.0539) 
Average effective real 0.0266*** 0.0259*** 0.0265*** 0.0258*** 
exchange rate (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0020) 
Crisis dummy 0.140*** 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.133*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0318) (0.0333) (0.0321) 
GDP growth (%) -0.0589*** -0.0580*** -0.059*** -0.058*** 
 (0.0087) (0.0085) (0.0088) (0.0086) 
Constant -2.477*** -2.541*** -2.480*** -2.543*** 
 (0.260) (0.253) (0.262) (0.254) 
lnsig2u   -2.648** -3.569 
_cons   (1.184) (2.595) 
N 158,316 158,316 158,316 158,316 
AIC 53,709.5 53,715.4 53,710.9 53,717.2 
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BIC 53,948.8 53,954.7 53,960.2 53,966.5 
3-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Top R&D intensity is less than 1. Estimators: (1) – pooled Logit; (2) - pooled Clog-
log; (3) - Logit random effects; (4) – Clog-log random effects. See Table 2 for other notes. 
 
 
Table A2b. Coefficient of variation measure of intra-industry firm size diversity and exit hazard: 
Different estimators  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Employment CV 0.0224*** 0.0217*** 0.0227*** 0.0218*** 
 (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0067) (0.0064) 
Employment CV*Log(R&Dint.+1) -0.124*** -0.119*** -0.124*** -0.119*** 
 (0.0299) (0.0286) (0.0299) (0.0284) 
Log(R&Dint.+1) -1.633*** -1.556*** -1.637*** -1.556*** 
 (0.389) (0.374) (0.391) (0.374) 
Log(R&Dint.+1) sq. 2.674*** 2.534*** 2.674*** 2.532*** 
 (0.569) (0.544) (0.572) (0.544) 
Log(firm Age) -0.464*** -0.445*** -0.459*** -0.443*** 
 (0.0231) (0.0223) (0.0238) (0.0230) 
Log(Employment) -0.427*** -0.413*** -0.434*** -0.416*** 
 (0.0263) (0.0256) (0.0282) (0.0269) 
Log(Employm.) sq. 0.0410*** 0.0397*** 0.0416*** 0.0399*** 
 (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0039) (0.0038) 
Log(Real turnover /  -0.220*** -0.212*** -0.221*** -0.213*** 
employees) (0.0173) (0.0166) (0.0173) (0.0166) 
Firm growth relative  -0.136*** -0.126*** -0.136*** -0.126*** 
to industry median growth (0.0213) (0.0199) (0.0214) (0.0200) 
Log(Plants) -0.0625* -0.0632* -0.0603* -0.0623* 
 (0.0354) (0.0345) (0.0360) (0.0348) 
Civil R&D only -0.202*** -0.195*** -0.202*** -0.195*** 
 (0.0285) (0.0277) (0.0287) (0.0277) 
UK-owned -0.157*** -0.154*** -0.158*** -0.154*** 
 (0.0484) (0.0474) (0.0489) (0.0477) 
Log(% entry rate) -0.131 -0.127 -0.131 -0.127 
 (0.130) (0.126) (0.131) (0.126) 
Log(Mean industry  0.0435** 0.0421** 0.0430** 0.0419*** 
employment ) (0.0170) (0.0164) (0.0169) (0.0162) 
Log(Median R&D int. 1.405*** 1.357*** 1.406*** 1.357*** 
in industry) (0.232) (0.221) (0.236) (0.223) 
Herfindahl index -0.0715 -0.0664 -0.0770 -0.0685 
 (0.134) (0.130) (0.135) (0.131) 
Pavitt 1 -0.148*** -0.145*** -0.145*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0487) (0.0474) (0.0496) (0.0478) 
Pavitt 2 -0.216*** -0.208*** -0.217*** -0.208*** 
 (0.0404) (0.0393) (0.0410) (0.0396) 
Pavitt 3 -0.0591 -0.0583 -0.0574 -0.0577 
 (0.0530) (0.0517) (0.0538) (0.0522) 
Pavitt 5 -0.110** -0.107** -0.111** -0.108** 
 (0.0559) (0.0541) (0.0562) (0.0539) 
Average effective real 0.0265*** 0.0258*** 0.0264*** 0.0258*** 
exchange rate (0.0020) (0.0020) (0.0021) (0.0020) 
Crisis dummy 0.140*** 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.133*** 
 (0.0330) (0.0318) (0.0333) (0.0321) 
GDP growth (%) -0.0592*** -0.0583*** -0.0595*** -0.0584*** 
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 (0.0088) (0.0086) (0.0088) (0.0086) 
Constant -2.463*** -2.527*** -2.466*** -2.529*** 
 (0.259) (0.252) (0.262) (0.254) 
lnsig2u   -2.511** -3.540 
_cons   (1.043) (2.527) 
N 158,313 158,313 158,313 158,313 
AIC 53,706.2 53,712.0 53,707.6 53,713.8 
BIC 53,945.5 53,951.4 53,956.9 53,963.1 
3-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Notes: Top R&D intensity is less than 1. Estimators: (1) – pooled Logit; (2) - pooled 
Clog-log; (3) - Logit random effects; (4) – Clog-log random effects. See Table 2 for other 
notes. 
 
Table A3. Effects of intra-industry age diversity on firm exit hazard. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Firm age coefficient of 
variation (CV age) 
0.443*** 
(0.0661) 
 0.469*** 
(0.0706) 
 
CV age*Log(R&Dint.+1) -0.902**  -0.876**  
 (0.351)  (0.373)  
Theil firm age index (TI age)  0.853***  0.909*** 
  (0.123)  (0.130) 
TI age*log(R&Dint.+1)  -1.808***  -1.748*** 
  (0.615)  (0.655) 
Log(R&Dint.+1) -0.489* -0.681*** -0.536* -0.723*** 
 (0.273) (0.208) (0.284) (0.214) 
Log(R&Dint.+1) sq. 1.171*** 1.170*** 1.186*** 1.184*** 
 (0.270) (0.270) (0.281) (0.280) 
Log(firm Age) -0.0689 -0.0642 0.0091 0.0145 
 (0.0596) (0.0596) (0.0632) (0.0632) 
Log(firm Age) sq. -0.0308** -0.0319** -0.0459*** -0.0471*** 
 (0.0127) (0.0127) (0.0136) (0.0135) 
Log(Employm.) -0.193*** -0.192*** -0.214*** -0.213*** 
 (0.0120) (0.0120) (0.0137) (0.0137) 
Log(Employm.) sq. 0.0186*** 0.0186*** 0.0205*** 0.0205*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0019) 
Log(Real turnover /  -0.0967*** -0.0967*** -0.102*** -0.102*** 
employees) (0.0078) (0.0078) (0.0079) (0.0079) 
Firm growth relative  -0.0706*** -0.0705*** -0.0716*** -0.0717*** 
to industry median growth (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0096) (0.0096) 
Log(Plants) -0.0228 -0.0225 -0.0208 -0.0205 
 (0.0156) (0.0156) (0.0162) (0.0162) 
Civil R&D only -0.0922*** -0.0938*** -0.0947*** -0.0965*** 
 (0.0130) (0.0130) (0.0138) (0.0138) 
UK-owned -0.0682*** -0.0680*** -0.0733*** -0.0731*** 
 (0.0211) (0.0211) (0.0222) (0.0222) 
Log(% entry rate) -0.0394 -0.0404 -0.0475 -0.0480 
 (0.0595) (0.0594) (0.0627) (0.0627) 
Log(Mean industry  0.0325*** 0.0313*** 0.0329*** 0.0319*** 
employment ) (0.0081) (0.0080) (0.0087) (0.0086) 
Log(Median R&D int. 0.476*** 0.469*** 0.485*** 0.475*** 
in industry) (0.112) (0.112) (0.117) (0.117) 
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Herfindahl index -0.104* -0.0993 -0.118* -0.114* 
 (0.0627) (0.0631) (0.0659) (0.0658) 
Pavitt 1 -0.0545** -0.0518** -0.0486** -0.0455** 
 (0.0214) (0.0214) (0.0228) (0.0228) 
Pavitt 2 -0.108*** -0.105*** -0.112*** -0.109*** 
 (0.0179) (0.0179) (0.0194) (0.0193) 
Pavitt 3 -0.0181 -0.0147 -0.0148 -0.0110 
 (0.0234) (0.0234) (0.0252) (0.0252) 
Pavitt 5 -0.0630** -0.0555** -0.0699** -0.0619** 
 (0.0257) (0.0256) (0.0276) (0.0275) 
Average effective real 0.0112*** 0.0111*** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 
exchange rate (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Crisis dummy 0.0630*** 0.0624*** 0.0579*** 0.0572*** 
 (0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0160) (0.0160) 
GDP growth (%) -0.0235*** -0.0233*** -0.0251*** -0.0248*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0036) (0.0037) 
Constant -1.775*** -1.673*** -1.845*** -1.739*** 
 (0.136) (0.131) (0.141) (0.136) 
lnsig2u   -2.344*** -2.343*** 
_cons   (0.0486) (0.0489) 
N 158313 158316 158313 158316 
AIC 53660.3 53661.2 53662.4 53662.6 
BIC 53909.6 53910.5 53921.7 53921.8 
3-digit industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Standard errors in parentheses. R&D intensity < 1;  by age. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
Number of firms - 35,570. (1) and (2) – Pooled probit estimations; (3) and (4) - Probit random-effects 
estimations. 
 
 
 
 
